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MAKING HISTORY

HISTORICAL NARRATIVES OF THE MAJI MAJI
Elijah Greenstein

This paper analyzes scholarship published in the late 1960’s on
the 1905-1907 Maji Maji revolt as a case study for exploring the
process whereby historians synthesize primary sources and create
historical narratives. Following Tanganyika’s independence in 1961,
scholars and students based at the University College in Dar es
Salaam, namely John Iliffe and Gilbert Gwassa, began to develop a
historical narrative of the revolt in the southeast of then German East
Africa. Historians accepted this narrative as the authoritative account
for several decades. This interpretation placed the origins of the
movement in German oppression, and emphasized both the unprecedented ethnic unity of the movement and the purely African
nature of the maji. “The Maji Maji Rebellion of 1905-07,” writes
Gilbert Gwassa, “is the national epic of Tanzania.”1 Since the mid1990’s, however, research has questioned this “nationalist” narrative, finding the origins of revolt in inter-African politics as much as
resentment against Europeans, and challenging long-standing notions of the movement’s unity and purely African character.2 An
analysis of both the historiography that precedes the 1960’s narratives as well as a collection of papers written by students at Dar es
Salaam in 1968 indicates that the historical context in which these
works were produced shaped their interpretation. It is the thesis of
this work that the combination of pre-existing historiography and
post-independence nationalism predisposed the Dar es Salaam researchers to create a Maji Maji national epic, and neglect those aspects of the revolt that did not conform to a vision of unity and
anti-colonial resistance.
Implicit in this thesis is the concept that the historical contexts in which historians produce historical narratives shape those
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narratives as much as the events they treat. Though historians seek
to reconstruct the past, their interpretation of the past is subject to the
influences of the present. Expounding on objectivity in history, Mark
Bevir says that as historians create historical narratives, “the theories
they already hold will influence the way they reconstruct historical
objects.”3 Pure experience being an impossibility, historians necessarily view historical objects subjectively from the perspective of
the present, and the resulting narratives therefore reflect theories of
the present. Steven Knapp, similarly discussing collective memory,
states that “our sense of what is symbolically useful in the past will
depend on our present sense of what matters, and the values represented by what we borrow from the past will only be the ones we already have. Aspects of the past that fail to match up with our present
dispositions will seem irrelevant.”4 Although Knapp’s work discusses historical narratives as a source of collective authority, his
words are relevant here. Derived from a broader corpus of historical
sources, historical narratives require historians to select that which
is “important” while abandoning the rest. Since even apolitical scholarly works are interpretations of historical material, the present-day
context in which the historian reads and synthesizes that material inevitably influences its reconstruction as a narrative. The context in
which the Dar es Salaam researchers conducted their research thus
contributed to the narrative that they produced.
The Maji Maji movement provides an ideal opportunity to
explore these themes: while the general course of the revolt is well
known, the specific sources of discontent and motivations for participation remain mysterious. Between 1905 and 1907, the revolt
consumed most of the southeast of German East Africa, a colony established by the Germans in the mid-1880’s that had only shortly
before suppressed significant Hehe resistance.5 The Maji Maji movement takes its name from the maji medicine the rebels used.6 The
maji medicine originated with the prophet Kinjikitile Ngwale, who
lived near Matumbe. Possessed in 1904 by the spirit Hongo, a subordinate to Bokero (the chief deity along the Rufiji), Kinjikitile
began to distribute medicine water, the maji, which he claimed
turned European bullets to water. Rebels that took the maji agreed to
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respect a set of proscriptions and wore millet stalks on their head as
identification. Hostilities broke out in mid-1905, when the Matumbi
of Nandete attacked the local akida, a German-appointed Arab colonial official, and uprooted cotton crops at a nearby plantation. Although the Germans quickly captured and hung Kinjikitile, the
uprising continued as hongos, prophets of Kinjikitile’s message,
spread the maji to Liwale, Dar es Salaam, the Mwera plateau and
eventually into the Southern Highlands (Maps 1 and 2). By 1907,
the Germans violently suppressed the rebellion by adopting a famine
policy intended to starve rebels into submission. Although this general narrative was well documented, the execution of the movement’s leaders by the Germans and absence of colonial officials in
rebel areas during the revolt kept the origins and expansion of the
movement mysterious. Questions of how such an ethnically diverse
section of the population could accept the maji and seemingly unite
in a mass movement unprecedented in scale remained largely unanswered for several decades. When historians began to answer these
questions in the 1960’s, the context in which they wrote heavily influenced the explanation they developed.
In order to place those post-independence narratives in context,
it is necessary to understand the colonial historiography they postdate. The Maji Maji revolt came on the heels of a series of revolts
and colonial scandals in German colonies, events that Germany’s
left-wing politicians held up as evidence of the majority party’s mismanagement of colonial affairs.7 As the German Left and colonial reformers emphasized colonial abuses for political gain, the Governor
of German East Africa, Graf von Götzen, rushed to absolve himself
by labeling the movement irrational and citing disgruntled sorcerers as its primary impetus. Following World War I more than a
decade later, Britain resurrected accounts of the Maji Maji revolt to
demonstrate the inability of either Germans or Africans to govern
and thereby strengthen their bid for control of Germany’s pre-war
colonial holdings, exaggerating both the brutality of German colonialism and the irrationality of the African water medicine and witch
doctors.8 During the push for independence that followed World War
II, the British returned to the history of the Maji Maji in order to ex-

Map 1. Ethnic Groups involved in the Maji Maji Rebellion
(Source: Gwassa, “Outbreak,” 14)
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plain motivations for the latest independence movements. R.M. Bell,
in an analysis of the Maji Maji movement published in 1950 again
emphasizes the roles of the magic water and German oppression in
instigating the revolt, concluding, “The secret of the Rebellion’s origins…can be summed up by the one word ‘OPPRESSION’.”9 European politics thus inclined colonial analyses to emphasize the roots
of Maji Maji as a revolt directed against German colonial oppression
and through traditional African means. This allowed both the German left and the British to condemn German colonial policies without undermining colonialism’s “civilizing mission.” Like earlier
colonial-era works, Bell’s account depicts a clear African-European
polarity at the root of the revolt, while drawing parallels to a new
wave of independence movements.
The Tanganyikan nationalists that pushed for independence in
the 1950’s also emphasized the distinctly African character of the
Maji Maji revolt and its opposition to European colonization, only
this time invoking it in defense of African liberation and as a source
of legitimacy for the fledgling Tanganyikan nation. Describing the
revolt in a 1956 speech to the U.N., Julius Nyerere, the leader of the
Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), claimed “the people
fought because they did not believe in the white man’s right to govern and civilize the black. They rose in a great rebellion…in response
to a natural call, a call of the spirit…to rebel against foreign domination.”10 After independence, Nyerere and TANU continued to refine this message. In 1962 Nyerere again claimed, “The Maji Maji
rebellion unified the people of Tanganyika so it was not something
new to talk about unity in Tanganyika,”11 and in 1967 Tanzania’s
Nationalist editorialized, “On the ashes of Maji-Maji our new nation was founded.”12 By continuing to stress colonial oppression as
the source of revolt and the traditional role and widespread appeal of
the maji to Tanganyika’s diverse masses, the nationalists found in
the Maji Maji movement traditions of interethnic unity and grassroots resistance to European rule. As an independent Tanganyika
emerged from Britain’s colonial holdings, the nationalists used the
Maji Maji as a historical precedent for the existence of a Tanganyikan nation.
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The Tanganyikans use of history to legitimize their nation’s existence and sovereignty is characteristic of nationalist movements
and familiar to students of nationalism. Benedict Anderson refers to
the paradox of “[t]he objective modernity of nations to the historian’s eye vs. their subjective antiquity in the eyes of nationalists.”13
Ernest Gellner also suggests, “nationalism is not the awakening and
assertion of these mythical, supposedly natural and given units. It
is, on the contrary, the crystallization of new units…though admittedly using as their raw material the cultural, historical and other inheritances from the pre-nationalist world,”14 and Eric Hobsbawm
warns, “modern nations and all their impedimenta generally claim to
be the opposite of novel, namely rooted in the remotest antiquity,
and the opposite of constructed, namely human communities so ‘natural’ as to require no definition other than self-assertion.”15 The nationalist is thus predisposed to a teleological interpretation of history
in which events naturally and inexorably lead to the creation of the
nation. To apply Knapp here, that which is symbolically useful to
the nationalists are those events that indicate the formation of the
nation; all else is irrelevant. Tanganyikan nationalists were therefore
inclined to look to their history for evidence of a historically extant
Tanganyikan nation. This is not intended to imply that the Dar es
Salaam researchers possessed a conscious nationalist bias; it remains, however, highly relevant that they conducted their research
and produced these narratives at a time when Africans looked to their
past for ways to define their present.
The Dar es Salaam students and teachers thus formulated their
theories on the Maji Maji after more than half-a-century of colonialera research established a sharp African-European dichotomy as the
basis for a purely African uprising. It was also a time when colonial
emancipation led Africans and Westerners alike to search for the
roots of African nationalism in African history. As independence
meant the rejection of European rule by Africans, much of the work
from Dar es Salaam focuses on German oppression as the initial catalyst of revolt. Iliffe’s 1967 article “The Organization of the Maji
Maji Rebellion” cites new, large-scale cotton growing projects as
the major reason for the first outbreak of revolt in the Rufiji com-

66

Making History

plex.16 Gwassa and Iliffe’s 1968 pamphlet Records of the Maji Maji
Rising, Part One also emphasizes the cotton-growing projects,17 and
Gwassa’s 1973 dissertation on the outbreak of the Maji Maji cites
Nandette men uprooting three shoots of cotton as the beginning of
active revolt.18 Despite the fact the uprising quickly led to the exchange of hostilities between African groups, Gwassa and Iliffe
largely emphasize European-African conflict as Maji Maji’s starting point.That they do so is unsurprising considering the historical
context. Until the Dar es Salaam students began to collect oral histories, European colonial records comprised the bulk of Maji Maji
source material.19 As described above, the Germans, as colonial administrators, largely focused on the extent to which the rebellion resulted from colonial mismanagement, and failed to consider other
factors. Moreover, decades of colonial rule had clearly demarcated
the lines between European colonists and the colonized Africans; in
the wake of independence, colonial oppression seemed the obvious
root of an uprising. Consequently, in the immediate post-colonial
context, Gwassa and Iliffe concentrated on those aspects of the revolt that fit the paradigm of European-African conflict.
The combination of colonial-era literature and modern nationalism also shaped Gwassa and Iliffe’s analysis of the role of the
maji. German and British efforts to portray the rebels as irrational
centered on the tradition-based faith in the maji water. In the wake
of unified African independence movements, however, historians
began to search for the historic roots of African unity. Terence
Ranger’s seminal 1968 work on connections between primary resistance in Africa and mass nationalism provided the foundation for
this conceptual framework. Looking for “continuity in mass emotion as well as…continuity in elite leadership” between early resistance movements such as the Maji Maji and modern nationalism,
Ranger postulates that the ability of prophet-led movements like
Maji Maji to “pass rapidly across clan and tribal boundaries, and to
sweep people into a unity” provided a foundation for later national
unity.20 While Ranger points out the limitations of this theory and
danger in adopting a nationalist historiography with a monopoly on
resistance,21 his theory on the revolutionary potential of reactionary
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forces shaped the general direction of work on resistance movements
in the 1960’s. Noticing the parallels to mass nationalism of resistance
movements that preceded nationalism in Africa, historians sought
an African basis for cross-ethnic unity beyond imported European
nationalism.
Both Gwassa and Iliffe drew on Ranger’s work;22 as a result, the
maji and prophet as sources of African unity are common themes in
their work. In “Organization,” Iliffe focuses on the maji medicine
that allowed the initial revolt to appeal to a broader population and
expand into a multiethnic, religious movement even though this expansion eventually crumbled due to organization along prior political and cultural groups that Iliffe describes as the “tension between
ideology and political and cultural reality which is characteristic of
mass movements, including later nationalist movements.”23 Gwassa
focuses on the important role played by the prophet, Kinjikitile, who,
he argues, mobilized and taught unity to Africans. The millennial
nature of the movement is stressed in Records, as is evident in the
following passage:
“The movement had begun in answer to the religious message of a prophet. The power of the maji—power over European weapons—depended on religious faith…Theirs’
was a revolutionary, or more accurately a millennial, message…It is likely that the people of southern Tanzania had
heard such millennial teachings before, but only as attacks
on witchcraft. Now this religious tradition was mobilized
against the Germans.”24

Gwassa further refines these concepts in his dissertation, again
placing Kinjikitile at the center of the movement for providing a
“unitary ideology which cut across and discouraged clan and ethnic
boundaries. The Maji as a war kinga was not to be of or for any single group, clan or ethnic identity but of and for all people.”25 Just
like Ranger, Gwassa and Iliffe both argue that the rebels adapted traditional cultural objects to colonial pressures, allowing them to cross
ethnic boundaries and mobilize the people in ways similar to mass
national movements. Gwassa and Iliffe fail to consider, however,
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that the rebels may have had a wide variety of reasons for participating in the revolt. Analysis of the unpublished 1968 Maji Maji Research Project indicates that even when researchers recorded such
examples, they overlooked them in their final conclusions.
The Maji Maji Research Project is a collection of oral histories
based on interviews conducted in 1968 by students of the University
College, Dar es Salaam in nine main areas (see Map 2), and the seminar papers the students wrote based on those reports and outlining
the history of Maji Maji in that area. The students carried out the research under the supervision of Ranger and Iliffe and with help from
Gwassa, and their analyses draw heavily from the work of these
scholars. A comparison of several of the interviews with the seminar
papers reveals that in many cases, interviews deviate from the historical narrative developed by Gwassa and Iliffe, yet the seminar papers still conform to the Dar es Salaam narrative. This, again, does
not indicate a conscious decision to avoid such accounts, but instead
again highlights that the theories the students already held influenced
their interpretation and construction of the historical narrative, and
led them to unconsciously overlook accounts that did not conform to
their preconceived dispositions.
The Ngoni under Chabruma accepted the maji from the Hongos
that brought it to Songea (Map 2, region 4), yet their motivation for
doing so and activity during the revolt challenge the Dar es Salaam
narrative. The Ngoni chafed under German rule for a number of reasons, among them colonial limits on the power and authority that
the Ngoni used to enjoy, and the end to Ngoni raids on neighboring
peoples.26 According to one interviewee, after establishing their rule
the Germans “began to issue orders to the Ngoni rulers. They forbade
them to conduct any wars or raids on neighboring tribes.”27 Another
interviewee says that the Ngoni hoped that after success in ridding
themselves of the Europeans, they “would be able to resume their
customs and old ways of life such as conducting wars and raids on
the neighboring tribes.”28 In their essays, the interviewers cite the
Ngoni desire to resume their raids against their neighbors,29 yet they
do not consider the implications this has for the theory of Maji Maji
as a mass movement. Although the Ngoni accepted the maji and

Elijah Greenstein

69

fought the Germans, the maji did not instill in the Ngoni a sense of
ethnic unity with other groups in southeastern Tanganyika. Instead,
they accepted the maji as a means to reestablish their dominance
over other ethnic groups. The limits of the Maji Maji appeal to interethnic unity is perhaps best demonstrated by an explanation of
why the neighboring Wamatengo and Wanyasa people did not receive the medicine from the Ngoni: “The Ngoni themselves were
not interested in spreading the movement to their neighbours as they
believed that those were too weak to fight.”30 While the Ngoni
sought to use the maji to unify the entire body of Ngoni, only after
a series of defeats did the Ngoni seek out alliance with other ethnic
groups.31 These interviews fail to demonstrate that the maji had some
inherent unifying power, and indicate instead that the Ngoni accepted the maji to defeat the Germans and resume their position of
relative strength vis-à-vis other ethnic groups. The seminar paper,
continuing to defend the unifying power of the maji, cites Ngoni attempts at unity within their own ethnic group, yet broader inter-ethnic unity is hardly a natural corollary of inter-Ngoni unity.
Equally interesting were the diverse motivations for individual
Ngoni leaders to participate in the movement. One of the interviewees cites political conflict between the leader of the Ngoni,
Chabruma, and Chabruma’s brother, Parangu, as underlying Ngoni
acceptance of the maji. Parangu made several attempts to take power
from Chibruma by instigating war with the Wabena. Failing, he persuaded the Wangindo to bring the maji to Chabruma hoping his
brother would fruitlessly attack the Germans.32 The interviewer expresses doubt over these reports, citing a note compiled by British
colonial officials in Songea, which indicates that a neighbor of
Parangu brought the maji to Chabruma having received it from a
man named Nakinjala. According to the interviewer, “this account
crushes the belief hitherto held by some of the Ngoni elders that maji
maji in Ungoni was engineered by a consiperacy (sic) of Parangu
against his brother Chabruma.”33 Despite these doubts, the interviewer lists several other rumors of personal grievances motivating
war with the Germans, notably as a means for Chabruma and Songea
Mbano, another Ngoni leader, to punish the Germans for outlawing

Map. 2 Place Names in Connection with Maji Maji (Modified from
Gwassa, “Outbreak,” 127)
Each region corresponds roughly to the nine areas in which the
Maji Maji Research Project students worked. 1: Uluguru, 2: Ukaguru/Kilosa, 3: Uhehe/Usagara, 4: Highland Ubena, 5: Usangu,
6: Ungoni, 7: Mwera/Makua, 8: Upogoro, 9: Umbunga.
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the death penalty for adultery and thereby preventing the two leaders from killing those they suspected of sleeping with their wives.34
These accounts further challenge interpretations of the maji as a unifying force. Rather than generating a unified, anti-European movement, the arrival of the maji may have instead given the Ngoni
leaders an opportunity to visit very personal revenges upon the Germans. The interviewers reference these personal motives in their
seminar papers, but fail to consider the the significance of these accounts in challenging Iliffe and Gwassa’s theories on maji maji engendering ethnic unity. Despite excellent analyses of the accounts,
the interviewers do little to challenge the prevailing themes as they
place these oral histories in the broader historical narrative.
Accounts from Msongozi and Kilosa Town (Map 2, regions 1
and 2) also indicate that the rebels coerced sections of the population
into participating in the revolt. Yet the interviewers, although referencing violence leveled at locals by rebels, continue to portray participation as based on faith in the liberating power of the maji. A
man from Msongozi explains that in the region the people call the rebellion “Homa Homa,” – referencing a stabbing motion – because
“Chitalika’s followers would stab anyone who seemed unwilling to
offer assistance.” He then describes an incident at Vigugu in which
rebels razed a village when the residents refused to accept the maji.35
Another resident of Msongozi describes fleeing from the maji rebels
with his parents and village elders; in response, the “Homa homa
people” set their food, homes, and the millet crops of a neighboring
village on fire.36 Near Kilosa Town, an employee of the Kilosa District Officer named Farahani refused to take the Maji, although, according to the source, he did not prevent the Hongos from providing
it to others. The interviewee then says, “On hearing this refusal, one
courageous man instantly stabbed Farahani in the stomach, and he
fell down dead…Chaos started and fights began between Farahani’s
relatives and Hongo’s people. It was during this incident that some
people started to burn homes, destroy shambas and crops.”37 The
concluding remarks of the interviewers acknowledge that fear of the
hongos played a role in motivating people to resist, yet, somewhat
paradoxically they maintain that German cruelty inspired the people

72

Making History

to welcome the appeal of the hongo’s to fight the German.38 The coercion of sections of the population into participating in the revolt
may have resulted in a mass movement, yet coerced action is not
conducive to the development of a mass, national consciousness.
These interviews indicate that inter-ethnic unity may have been only
surface deep. Yet the interviewers do not bring attention to the fact
that such accounts diverge significantly from Iliffe and Gwassa’s
work.
The account of the siege of Image by the Sagara (Map 2, region
3), a subgroup of the Hehe, indicates that in some regions acceptance
of the maji may have contributed more to interethnic competition
than to cooperation. Only some of the Sagara initially accepted the
maji when the honga brought it to Uhehe. The Jumbe of Image,
Mvinge, who was “also sort of Head Jumbe over Usagara” attempted
to warn the Germans, but they ignored him. Mvinge attempted to
fight the rebels alone, but rebels led by Lihoha defeated him at Mahenge; as a result, the rest of the Sagara joined the rebellion, and decided to attack Image. Following defeat at the hands of the Germans,
the Sagara fled Image only to be pursued by the Hehe, who cooperated with the Germans.39 Another interviewee explains that the Hehe
pursuit of the Sagara derived from the brief presence of the Sagara
in Image, during which the Sagara took women captives and burned
houses and stores, an event that “was very short but disastrous and
shameful to us.”40 This account is substantiated by a man from
Malangali, Mzee Kawosa Mwamakasi, who claims that the people
of Malangali went to fight after hearing of Mvinge’s death, because
“they were going to revenge the death of Mvinge.”41 The arrival of
the maji in Uhehe thus initially led to hostilities between the Sagara
and Hehe, and only later involved the Germans. The interviewer argues that the Hehe only cooperated with the Germans against the
Maji rebels because the rising “occured [sic] at the wrong time for
them,” and, having resisted the Germans in the 1890’s and suffered
major military defeats, the Hehe, unlike other tribes, understood the
extent of Germany’s military capabilities.42 In the first exchange of
hostilities, however, Mvinge took the initiative to attack the rebels
without German support, ignoring the advice of the German admin-
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istrators of Usagara to wait for German troops. An interviewee states
that Mvinge “was impatient and was determined to fight the Sagara
alone.”43 This does not demonstrate Hehe accommodation of a superior German power, but rather the exacerbation of existing interethnic rivalries by the maji movement. Moreover, the Sagara
rebels did not initially attack the Germans, but the Hehe at Imaga, indicating that for the Sagara, the Maji movement was not entirely an
anti-European movement, but also derived from existing ethnic tensions.
The outbreak of rebellion in Uzungwa (Map 2, region 3) demonstrates the dual forces of coercion and cooperation at work; some of
the population sided with the Mbunga and Pogoro Maji rebels from
Mahenge and Ifakara, while others resisted the maji and collaborated with the Germans. One interviewee recalls, “fights occurred
in Uzungwa even before Germans came to help those who resisted
the Mbunga.”44 Significantly, the interviewees do not refer to the
rebels in terms of maji or honga, but as the Mbunga, the ethnic group
that brought the maji to Uzungwa. Two other accounts additionally
reveal both that the Zungwa associated the Maji rebellion with the
Mbunga, and that this association proved a source of discontent with
the movement itself. One interviewee says, “The people hated them
[the Maji rebels]; even their allies were suspicious. The Mbunga
simply took whatever they found in Uzungwa – food, cattle, sheep,
goats, women, etc. They really did a lot of harm.”45 The other supports this, saying, “These people [the Mbunga] were very rough and
cruel; on their way they could take anything they wanted – cattle,
sheep, goats, chicken, women, grain, etc.”46 The interviewer argues
that most Zungwa refused to participate in the movement due to
recognition of Germany’s military superiority.47 The use of
“Mbunga” to describe the movement, however, indicates that the
Zungwa did not view the Maji as a cross-ethnic movement, but
rather as a more limited anti-German revolt localized to a single ethnic group. Moreover, Mbunga treatment of Zungwa rebels is not
characteristic of a mass movement sweeping aside ethnic differences; instead, Mbunga participation might have been at least in part
motivated by the opportunity to steal goods from other ethnic
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groups. These accounts thus paint a more complicated picture of
both Zungwa hesitation to join the movement and Mbunga motivation for participation.
The papers of the Maji Maji Research Project provide an interesting perspective on the role of historical context in the creation of
historical narratives. Interviews with Ngoni participants and witnesses reveal that anti-German sentiments derived from pre-existing interethnic conflict, and that personal reasons for participation
sometimes overshadowed sentiments for greater cross-ethnic unity.
Accounts from Mzongi and Kilosa Town that demonstrate the use of
coercion in encouraging participation likewise throw into question
the ability of the maji to inspire interethnic unity. Descriptions of
Hehe-Sagara and inter-Zungwa conflict also challenge the movement’s anti-colonial roots and degree of interethnic unity. The seminar papers prepared by the Dar es Salaam students, however, largely
conform to the historical narrative developed by Iliffe and Gwassa,
stressing the unifying power of the maji and the movement’s anticolonial origins. The variations between Maji Maji sources and
1960’s narratives thus demonstrate the influence of the historical
context of the historian’s construction of historical narratives. Recently, new works are pointing out some of those variations. James
Monson’s 1998 article on the Maji Maji in Tanzania’s southern highlands, and Felicitas Becker’s 2004 work on “Big Men” in southeast
Tanzania both challenge longstanding views on Maji Maji’s anticolonial character, and Thaddeus Sunseri’s two articles in 1999 and
2000 on the creation of the Tanzanian resistance tradition question
the unifying power of the maji and the purely African nature of the
movement.48 Several decades removed from the immediate postcolonial period, it is now an opportune moment to reexamine this
moment in history, reconsider the prevailing historical narrative, and
reveal some of the long-neglected complexities of Maji Maji.
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